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Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right
to Discriminate Versus Freedom
from Discrimination
In 1968, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.' revitalized the Civil Rights
Act of 18662 as an instrument with which to attack racial discrimina-
tion by private clubs and private schools. Jones consequently reawak-
ened the conflict between freedom of association, which many have
believed gives private groups a right to discriminate, and freedom
from racial discrimination, guaranteed by the principles of equality
undergirding the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.3
Existing legal doctrine, this Note will argue, provides no clear solu-
tion to the conflict presented; the courts will be forced to develop new
doctrine which balances the interests of private groups that wish to
discriminate and individuals who wish to be free from discrimination.
This Note will examine alternative policies toward the conflict and
their likely impact on the opposing interests. It will emphasize a range
of alternatives short of a complete exemption from the 1866 Act for
private groups which would nevertheless preserve a meaningful de-
gree of freedom to choose social intimates.
1. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
2. Now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970).
3. Commentators first noticed the conflict created by applying § 1981 to private groups
shortly after Jones. See, e.g., Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REv.
470, 501-03. Commentary since then has generally pointed out the conflict and offered
an opinion that it should or will be resolved against the interests of all or many private
groups. See Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the
Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 523
(1974); Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: Section 1981 as an Alternative to State
Action, 62 GEo. L.J. 1363, 1396, 1400 (1974); Note, Association, Privacy and the Private
Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LiB. L. REV. 460, 470 (1970);
Note, The Desegregation of Private Schools: Is Section 1981 the Answer?, 48 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1147, 1171-72 (1973); Note, Constitutional Law-Private Club Discrimination, 1970
Wis. L. REV. 595, 600-02.
A more thorough treatment of the problem is needed at this time for two reasons.
First, discrimination by private clubs and private schools is coming under increasing
attack, making the time for resolution of the problem by the courts imminent. Second,
several important jurists have expressed a great regard for private group rights. See pp.
1456-57 & note 77 infra. Since many other judges may share these views, the creation of an
exemption from § 1981 for bona fide private groups is a clear possibility. This Note will
suggest alternative solutions which might sufficiently preserve group rights without
granting a complete exemption from § 1981.
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I. The Limits of Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation
Two significant institutions left untouched by the federal 4 civil
rights legislation of the 1960's5 were private schools and private clubs.,
Because these institutions were excluded from the coverage of the
legislation, a substantial amount of private discrimination has con-
tinued.
A. The Private Club Exemption
A primary force behind the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
was the need for antidiscrimination legislation covering public accom-
modations.7 The public accommodations title exempted from its cov-
erage "private club[s and] other establishment[s] not in fact open to
the public." The legislative history indicates that at least some mem-
4. Several states have had civil rights statutes for a number of years. But due to the
absence of legislation in many states and a disappointing record of enforcement, the
most effective remedies for private discrimination have resulted from the federal statutes.
See Caldwell, State Public Accommodations Laws, Fundamental Liberties and Enforce-
ment Programs, 40 WAsH. L. REv. 841 (1965).
5. The major pieces of legislation were the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 243; and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81.
Public accommodations were dealt with in Title II of the 1964 Act (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a (1970)). Employment discrimination was treated in Title VII of that Act (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970)). The housing discrimination provisions are codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970).
6. The legislation also left a number of other, less significant gaps. The public ac-
commodations provisions do not reach small bars not selling food; nor do they reach
grocery stores and department stores not selling food for consumption on the premises,
retail shops, and services such as those of doctors, dentists and skilled tradesmen. Larson,
supra note 3, at 475-76.
The public accommodations and housing statutes exempt "Mrs. Murphy's Boarding-
house"-lodging with less than five units and occupied by the owner. See 42 U.S.C. §§
2000a(b)(1), 3603(b)(2) (1970). The housing statute allows private clubs and religious or-
ganizations to give preference to members. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1970). The employment
discrimination statute exempts firms having under 15 employees and private clubs. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970). To some extent the application of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
in these contexts creates the same sort of problems discussed in this Note.
7. Sit-in demonstrations had become widespread by the spring of 1963. A series of
sit-in cases had reached the Supreme Court beginning in 1960, with counsel for the
demonstrators arguing for an extension of the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), to nullify state criminal trespass law enforcement when triggered by private racial
prejudice, thus raising the prospect of violent self-help in the absence of new legislation.
See Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal
Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855, 859-67 (1966).
Outlawing discrimination in public accommodations was generally thought not to
threaten legitimate rights of association. Even at early common law innkeepers and com-
mon carriers were obligated to accept any person seeking accommodations. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Rogers, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (K.B. 1683); People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 427, 18
N.E. 245, 248 (1888); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENT § 476 (9th ed.
1878). See generally Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 296-300 (1964) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring). This right of access, however, did not extend to places of public amusement
and entertainment. See Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d
697, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
In the sit-in cases, the willingness of the lunch counters, restaurants and motels to
accept any white person nullified their claim to freedom to discriminate. See generally
Bell v. Maryland, supra at 314 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Sengstock & Sengstock, Dis-
crimination: A Constitutional Dilemma, 9 Wt. & MARY L. REv. 59, 119 (1967).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
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bers of Congress felt that the exemption was included to avoid in-
fringing upon rights of association and privacy. But the exemption
also reflects the simple fact that the harm to which the legislation
was primarily addressed was discrimination in public accommodations
rather than in private groups.' 0
After the passage of the act, a number of restaurants, amusement
parks, and swimming pools sought to escape the statute by alleging
private club status." The resulting litigation produced a substantial
amount of case law which gave a strict construction to the club ex-
emption. 12 However, the exemption still represents a significant gap
in the civil rights legislation.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 9 (1963) (minority report of
House Judiciary Comm. on H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963)): "Moreover, where
freedom of association might logically come into play as in cases of private organizations,
title II quite properly exempts bona fide private clubs and other establishments."
10. Sen. Humphrey, for example, remarked:
Title II ... is designed to reach the most significant manifestations of discrimination.
It is carefully drafted and moderate in nature. There is no desire to regulate truly
personal or private relationships .... This does not mean that discrimination in the
operation of such facilities is any more defensible or moral than elsewhere, but
merely that discrimination in such establishments is not of major dimension,
especially when compared with the other problems with which Title II and the
bill as a whole deals.
110 CONG. REc. 6534 (1964) (referring specifically to the exemption for "Mrs. Murphy's
Boardinghouse").
11. See, e.g., Wall St. J., July 22, 1964, at 1, col. 4; Wash. Post, Aug. 16, 1964, § A, at
6, col. 4.
12. The courts developed a number of factors which could be examined to determine
whether the alleged clubs were "truly private" or in fact "sham clubs" actually open to
the (white) public. One area of inquiry has been whether there is evidence of genuine
selectivity. Decisions finding clubs to be public accommodations have found significant:
the absence of formal membership selection procedures, Stout v. YMCA, 404 F.2d 687, 688
(5th Cir. 1968); failure to reject a significant number of white applicants, Nesmith v.
YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir. 1968); extending club facilities to nonmembers in
disregard of club bylaws, United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90,
92-93 (E.D. La. 1967); the absence or insubstantiality of dues and exceedingly large mem-
bership lists, Bradshaw v. Whigham, 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 934, 936 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
Several courts have cited advertising as evidence of a lack of selectivity. See, e.g., United
States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 376 (E.D. La. 1969).
Other decisions have looked to the extent to which the membership exercised rights of
control over the alleged clubs. Courts denying the exemption have considered as relevant
evidence that: members did not own club facilities, Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301
(1969); profits from the use of club facilities were retained by the operator, United States
v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1968); members had no control over the operations
of the establishment, Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1155 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
Some courts have looked to the intent of the organizers of the club, denying an
exemption where the club was formed to evade the public accommodations law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Northwest La. Restaurant Club, 256 F. Supp. 151, 152-53 (W.D. La.
1966). Some purpose other than the exclusion of blacks from an otherwise public facility
has been required. United States v. Johnson Lake, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (S.D.
Ala. 1970). Only rarely have private club claims been sustained. See Evans v. Laurel
Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. Va. 1966) (dictum; although golf course must
accept black players and spectators, golf association with 75 members, not a party de-
fendant, would be exempt). See generally Note, Public Accommodations Laws and the
Private Club, 54 GEo. L.J. 915 (1966) (similar cases applying state laws); Comment, Public
Accommodations: What Is a Private Club?, 30 MONT. L. REv. 47 (1968); Note, The
Private Club Exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in Judicial Confusion,
44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1112 (1969).
1443
The Yale Law Journal
B. The Exclusion of Private Schools
The Fourteenth Amendment, which substantially curtailed public
school discrimination, has never been extended to prohibit private
school discrimination because of the required showing of state ac-
tion.13 In Fourteenth Amendment cases challenging discrimination
by private schools which were receiving state aid, the courts have
generally noted that without the specific state involvement challenged,
the Fourteenth Amendment would not reach discrimination by pri-
vate schools. 14
Many private schools, even if they do not receive state aid, might
be considered a type of public accommodation.15 They provide in re-
turn for a fee educational services to consumers drawn from the gen-
eral public. Nevertheless, private schools were not included in the
public accommodations provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.'
This has resulted in virtual immunity in most jurisdictions from gov-
ernment prohibitions against discrimination, and private schools have
consequently become a focal point of resistance to forced integration
in the public schools.'
Given the blanket exemptions of private clubs and private schools
from the public accommodations title, litigation under the 1964 Act
to test the rights of the clubs or schools to discriminate was virtually
impossible. A landmark decision of the Supreme Court in 1968,1s
however, created a substantive legal basis for such action using a long
forgotten statute enacted shortly after the Civil War.
18. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See generally Note, State Action: Theories
for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUN,. L. REV. 656 (1974).
14. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973). Some commentators have
suggested that more liberal definitions of state action should be applied so that private
schools could be ordered to desegregate. See, e.g., Note, Federal Tax Benefits to Segregated
Private Schools, 68 COLUM,. L. REV. 922, 926-37 (1968); Note, Post-Brown Private 'hite
Schools-An Imperfect Dualism, 26 VAND. L. REV. 587, 623-24 (1973); Note, Segregation
Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1453-58 (1973).
15. Several northern and western states have civil rights statutes which treat private
schools as public accommodations. See Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in "Private" Schools,
9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 39, 47-48 (1967); note 97 infra.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(l)-(4) (1970). Title IV of the Act authorized the Com-
missioner of Education to provide technical assistance in the implementation of school
desegregation plans and authorized the Attorney General to bring civil suits for the
desegregation of schools on behalf of parents unable to do so themselves. 42 U.S.C. §
2000c-2,-3,-4,-6 (1970). The definitions limited the act to "public schools" operated by a
state entity or dependent upon governmental funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(c) (1970).
Even if they had been included among the types of accommodations reached by the
act, private schools "not in fact open to the public" could escape the application of the
statute because the private club exemption applies to both clubs and "other establish-
ment[s]" not open to the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
17. See Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, supra note 14.
18. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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II. The Civil Rigfits Act of 1866
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides that:
[AIl1 persons ... shall have the same right .. . to make and en-
force contracts ... and ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property ... as is enjoyed by white
citizens .... 19
The debates in the Congress indicate that while some Congressmen
believed that the statute would reach private discrimination, 20 others
thought that only disabilities imposed on blacks by state law would
be reached.21 Doubt over the capacity of the Congress, under the
Thirteenth Amendment's authorization to abolish slavery,22 to enact
legislation that would outlaw actions taken by the states formed one
reason for the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.23
In order to remove constitutional doubt on this score, the 1866 Act
was reenacted in 1870.24 The relevant portions of the old act are
19. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. After reenactment and codification, §
1 of the 1866 Act now appears as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970). See note 24 infra. Note
that the statute addresses the limited problem of racial discrimination against blacks
rather than the broader concepts of "equal protection" for all groups developed under
the Fourteenth Amendment. But see note 40 infra. The discussion herein will be limited
to situations involving such discrimination against blacks.
20. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475, 599 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trum-
bull). See generally Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justifica-
tion for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 1024, 1025-33 (1972); tenBroek,
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 171,
174-99 (1951).
21. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118-19 (remarks of Rep. Wilson),
1291 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham). See also id. at 476 (Sen. Trumbull stating
that the Act would have no effect in a state whose laws were not discriminatory).
The contradictory nature of the statements of the Congressmen is demonstrated from
the selections used by the majority and dissenters in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 422-32, 454-73 (1968). See note 31 infra.
22. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII provides in its entirety:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion.
23. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1948). H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 94-95 (1908); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1329 (1952).
The language of the Fourteenth Amendment which has had the greatest impact on
discrimination provides:
No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 144. Section 1 of the 1866 Act was
reenacted in § 18. The language of the 1866 Act was repeated with some alterations in §
16 of the 1870 Act. When these provisions were codified in 1874, the codifiers' historical
note for what was to become 42 U.S.C. § 1981 incorrectly specified its origin as § 16 of
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currently referred to as § 1981 and § 1982.25
For years the statute was given a narrow construction by the Su-
preme Court. According to the Court, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments gave Congress the power to prohibit state-imposed legal
disabilities and privately imposed involuntary servitude, but not pri-
vate discrimination.2 6 In 1948 the Court introduced a requirement
that state action must be shown before a violation of the 1866 Act
could be found.2 7 No case arising under the 1866 Act reached the
Court again until Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 28 in 1968.
In that case Joseph Lee Jones alleged that the refusal of Mayer and
the other defendants to sell him a house was racially motivated and
the 1870 Act. This led one court to conclude that § 1981 was based on the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than the Thirteenth, and that "state action" was required. Cook v.
Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 458 F.2d 1119
(5th Cir. 1972). See Note, supra note 20, at 1036-39. The court in Cook seems to have
overlooked the Supreme Court's reference in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. to § 18 of the
1870 Act as the source of both §§ 1981 and 1982 and its holding that reenactment did
not limit §. 1982 to "state action." 392 U.S. at 422 n.28, 436-37 (1968). For this and other
reasons the view expressed in Cook has been rejected in other cases. See, e.g., Sanders v.
Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
25. The codifiers split a single sentence from the 1866 Act to form the two sections.
Section 1982 became the source of a "same right" in property transactions only. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1970):
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970):
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Ter-
ritory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property.
26. In a decision arising from several cases challenging the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, a later enacted federal public accommodations law, the Supreme
Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), defined the scope of the congressional
power under the post-Civil War amendments in a manner having a profound impact on
all of the existing legislation. In holding the 1875 statute unconstitutional the Court
ruled that congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment was limited to
eliminating "slavery and its incidents." The Court held that while this might include
legislation prohibiting private persons from imposing involuntary servitude upon others,
the Congress had no power to prohibit a private refusal to admit blacks to a public
accommodation because "such an act... has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary
servitude." 109 U.S. at 23-24.
Although the 1866 Act was not before the Court, the decision stated that the purpose
of that act was the removal of legal disabilities that had formerly been imposed on
slaves and freedmen. Id. at 24-25. Later decisions of the Supreme Court applied just as
narrow a construction to the 1866 Act. In two cases the Court refused to apply the
statute to private interference with the making of contracts because no "condition of
enforced compulsory service" was involved. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16
(1906) (private acts of intimidation preventing the making of employment contracts);
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926) (restrictive covenants controlling the resale
of real estate). See generally Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary
Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1294, 1303-06 (1969).
27. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948). But see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 420 n.25 (1968) (criticizing the Hurd Court's assertion that this requirement had
been part of the holding in Corrigan v. Buckley).
28. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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a violation of § 1982. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Jones, 29
holding that § 1982 "bars all racial discrimination, private as well as
public, in the sale or rental of property." 30 Private refusals to sell
based on race were said to deny blacks the " 'same right as is enjoyed
by white citizens.'"31 The Court held that § 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power "rationally to determine what are
the badges and incidents of slavery and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation." 32 A conclusion that private
discrimination in property transactions was such an incident of slavery
was not an irrational one, according to the Court. 33
In the years since Jones, the 1866 Act has become an alternative
ground for the decisions in many cases based on the more recent
civil rights legislation 34 and has occasionally filled gaps left by these
later statutes.35 Section 198136 has been most often applied to refusals'
29. The district and circuit courts dismissed the claim because no state action had
been proven. 255 F. Supp. 115, 120-21 (E.D. Mo. 1966), af 'd, 379 F.2d 33, 43-46 (8th Cir.
1967).
30. 392 U.S. at 413 (emphasis in original).
31. Id. at 421 (ellipses omitted, emphasis in original). The Court's interpretation of
the words "same right" has been criticized by several commentators. See, e.g., Henkin,
Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 85-86 (1968). The Court supported
this interpretation of the statute with extensive quotations from the debates in the
39th Congress. 392 U.S. at 423-35. The majority's interpretation of the legislative history
has also drawn criticism from several sources. See 392 U.S. at 457-76 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting); C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECON-
STRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 1207-58 (1971); Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.:
Judicial Activism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REV. 485, 495-97 (1969).
32. 392 U.S. at 440. This essentially overruled the earlier cases. See notes 26-27 supra.
For the text of the Thirteenth Amendment, see note 22 supra.
33. 392 U.S. at 440-41. The Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883), had
said that this "would be running the slavery argument into the ground."
The Court also dismissed the argument that the reenactment of § 1982 in 1870 after
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment limited its reach to "state action." 392 U.S. at
436-37.
34. The § 1982 prohibition of discrimination in property transactions provides an
alternative ground in cases based on the 1968 Fair Housing statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31
(1970). See, e.g., Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
35. Section 1982 has provided a cause of action in several cases which would not fit
under the 1968 housing statute. Discrimination before the effective date of the statute
was reached in Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio 1968). Section
1982 has helped plaintiffs circumvent various technical limitations in the 1968 Act. See,
e.g., Warren v. Norman Realty Co., No. 74-1459 (8th Cir., Mar. 21, 1975) (statute of
limitations-42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1970)); Wright v. Kaine Realty, 352 F. Supp. 222
(N.D. Ill. 1972) ($1000 limit on punitive damages-42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970)); McLaurin
v. Brusturis, 320 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (exhaustion of remedies under state law-
42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970)).
Section 1982 has also been applied to discrimination outside the substantive scope of
the 1968 Act. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zaremba, 381 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (small owner-
occupied rental units-42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1970)); Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151
(N.D. Ohio 1969) (single family house-42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1970)).
36. Although § 1981 was not before the Court, the Jones decision effectively made this
statute applicable to private discrimination as well, because the Court explicitly recognized
the common origin of the two sections. 392 U.S. at 422 n.28, 441-42 n.78. The Court in
Jones also explicitly overruled Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), which had
dealt only with § 1981, as "incompatible with the history and purpose of the Thirteenth
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to make contracts for employment.3 7 Outside of the employment con-
text the use of the statute has been more limited, but it has been
applied to the contracts involved in the purchase of a ticket to an
amusement park38 and the admission of patients to a private hospital.30
The courts are committed to the proposition that the "same right to
make contracts" bars refusals to deal based on race.40
Amendment." 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. See note 26 supra. Furthermore, the prohibition of
private discrimination in addition to legal disabilities stemmed from the Court's inter-
pretation of the term "same right" in § 1982. Section 1981 uses the same term.
37. Each circuit presented with the question has applied § 1981 to employment dis-
crimination. See, e.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Young v. ITT, 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach.
Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses,
Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Long v. Ford Motor
Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir.
1972). Section 1981 has helped plaintiffs circumvent some procedural limitations of the
employment discrimination provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See note 72 infra.
38. Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970). See
Williams v. Kansas City, 104 F. Supp. 848, 859 (W.D. Mo. 1952), a!f'd, 205 F.2d 47 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953) (swimming pool); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697
(3d Cir. 1949) (same).
39. United States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145, 152 (D.S.C. 1969). In another
case, Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D.
Mass. 1972), the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss a § 1981 claim because
plaintiff had alleged that the fraternal organization was actually primarily a seller of
insurance.
40. The application of the 1866 Act to discrimination against groups other than
blacks is unsettled. The statute gives "all persons" the same specified rights as "white
citizens." Therefore it seems that the statute offers little to a plaintiff who is himself a
white citizen. See Perkins v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98, 99 (D. Md. 1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d
426 (4th Cir. 1960); Marshall v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 60, 343 F. Supp. 70, 72
(E.D. La. 1972). But see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1413 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull
stating that addition of phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" as suggested by House
would not alter the meaning of the bill, that the rights of all persons shall be equal).
See also id. at 599. Some courts, however, have indicated that the statute prohibits all
racial discrimination, including such discrimination against whites. See Carter v.
Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (modifying
an order requiring an absolute preference for minority applicants to a local fire depart-
ment; Fourteenth Amendment alternative ground for decision); Hollander v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., Civil No. H-74-398 (D. Conn., Mar. 27, 1975) (white student refused admission
to internship program for minorities); WRMA Broadcasting Co. v. Hawthorne, 365 F.
Supp. 577, 581-82 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (discrimination against white applicant by black
employer); Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240, 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd on other
grounds, 450 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1971) (disruption by blacks of white church service;
aff'd on basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) only); Central Presbyterian Church v. Black
Lib. Front, 303 F. Supp. 894, 899 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (disruption of white church service).
By equating the rights of "persons" and "citizens" the statute seems to prohibit dis-
crimination based on alienage rather than race. Before Jones the use of the statute to
strike down state-imposed legal disabilities on aliens was well established. See Takahashi
v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640
(1948); Roberto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811, 813-14 (7th Cir. 1949). See also
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971). Applying the principles laid down in
Jones, some courts are now recognizing that the statute applies to private discrimination
based on alienage. See Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529, 533-38
(S.D. Tex. 1972), modified, 498 F.2d 641, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1974) (employment discrimina-
tion); League of Academic Women v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 343 F. Supp. 636, 639-40
(N.D. Calif. 1972) (dictum). Some cases say that the statute is limited solely to racial
discrimination, apparently ignoring the alienage question. See, e.g., Georgia v. Rachel,
384 U.S. 780, 791-92 (1966); Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226, 230 (9th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 959 (1957).
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Although the 1866 Act has great potential for attacking discrimina-
tion in private clubs and private schools, 41 that potential remains
largely unrealized. Two cases involving the application of the statute
to allegedly private clubs have reached the Supreme Court. But in both
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 42 and Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Association43 the conflict between the broad sweep
of the revitalized 1866 Act and the associational interests of club mem-
bers was not resolved. In both cases the Supreme Court held that the
clubs could not have qualified as private clubs under the 1964 public
accommodations statute.44 They were subject to the 1866 Act because,
having "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness other than race," they
were not "truly private. '' 45 These cases establish a rule that qualifica-
tion as a private club under the public accommodations case law is
a necessary condition to the grant of any theoretical exemption from
the 1866 Act. But the Supreme Court has not yet been forced to de-
cide whether being a "truly private" club for the purposes of the
1964 Act is also a sufficient condition for an exemption from § 1981.46
The statute has not yet been applied to discrimination against white citizens based on
their religion or national origin. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413
(1968); Marshall v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 60, supra at 72; Schetter v. Heim, 300
F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1969). But see Sanchez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 499
F.2d 1107, 1108 (10th Cir. 1974) ("On its face at least it seems thin to hold that because
a Spanish speaking citizen is a Caucasian, thereby he cannot take advantage of this
statute"; remanded, in part for consideration of this question).
The statute has been generally held not to apply to sex discrimination. See League of
Academic Women v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., supra at 640; Williams v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438, 440 (N.D. Calif. 1972); Fitzgerald v. United Method-
ist Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965, 966 (D. Neb. 1972). But see Long v. Sapp, 502
F.2d 34, 39 & n.2, 40 (5th Cir. 1974) (assuming that Title VII case law on sex discrimina-
tion is applicable to § 1981 and remanding for determination of a sex discrimination
claim).
41. The existence of contracts in these situations seems well established. See, e.g.,
Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333, 1339 (2d Cir. 1974) (entry to club
pool after payment of fee constitutes a contract); North Dakota v. North Cent. Ass'n, 23
F. Supp. 694, 699 (E. D. Il.), aff'd, 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938) (membership in an associa-
tion constitutes a contract); Asheville School for Training in Christian Leadership, 269
I11. App. 365, 369 (1933) (acceptance of written application for enrollment in a private
school constitutes completed contract).
42. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
43. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
44. See pp. 1442-43 supra.
45. The Court in Sullivan adapted this test from the decision in Daniel v. Paul, 395
U.S. 298, 301-02 (1969), which had refused to apply the private club exemption to the
"Lake Nixon Club" in a case arising directly under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. 396 U.S. at 236.
This test was subsequently applied in Tillnan. 410 U.S. at 438. See also Olzman v. Lake
Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333, 1336 (2d Cir. 1974). These cases avoid serious con-
sideration of associational interests by relying on the strong presumption which has
developed in public accommodations case law that offering to serve the general public
negates a right to discriminate, while leaving open the possibility that "truly private"
clubs might be exempt from § 1981. See notes 7, 12 supra.
46. The lower courts in both Sullivan and Tillman had held §§ 1981-82 inapplicable
because a private club was involved. The Supreme Court in Tillnan specifically noted
that its decision did not reach that question. Two district courts have assumed that §
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Section 1981 was found to apply to refusals to admit young black
students to all-white private schools in two significant recent cases.47
In Riley v. Adirondack Southern School for Girls48 the court indi-
cated in dictum a readiness to apply § 1981 to a school which was
"truly private," but the associational issue was not reached because
the plaintiffs could not make the threshold showing that their exclu-
sion was based solely on race.49 In Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School,
Inc.5O the district court borrowed the "truly private" rubric from the
Sullivan and Tillman decisions and found that the school could not
qualify as such.51 This finding implicitly likened the school to a public
accommodation open to the public, and the court thereby avoided
resolving the conflict between the Thirteenth Amendment legislation
and associational interests just as the Supreme Court had done.52 But
the district court's opinion indicated that it may have applied the
"plan or purpose of exclusiveness other than race" test incorrectly,
looking to the specific instance of discrimination rather than to the
1981 cannot be applied to secure membership in a private organization. See Solomon v.
Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Sims v. Order of United
Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112, 113-14 & n.1 (D. Mass. 1972).
47. In addition to these cases, the district court in Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326
F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971), held that § 1981 prohibited a refusal to admit blacks to a
private barber school. While the court noted that private associational interests might be
threatened in some applications of the statute, it saw no such threat in this case. Nothing
in the decision indicates whether the school was "truly private" or "in fact open to the
public."
48. 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1976 (5th Cir., Apr. 15,
1974).
49. The black applicant was allowed to complete the application procedures, and the
court found from the evidence that the rejection was based on other, nonracial criteria.
The court said that it was required to resolve the question which went unanswered in
Tillman because the defendant school was "truly private." 368 F. Supp. at 397 & nn.6, 7.
In fact, the court did not answer that question because in Riley the exclusion was not
based solely on race as it had been in Tillnan. In the absence of racial discrimination §
1981 is not applicable regardless of the nature of the group. But see note 40 supra. Be-
cause the only admissions requirements involved the judgment of the headmaster, the
rejection was based on subjective criteria. See note 148 infra.
50. 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd in relevant part sub non. McCrary v.
Runyon, No. 73-2348 (4th Cir., Apr. 15, 1975) (en banc). The district court decision
sparked a great deal of comment. See, e.g., Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: Section
1981 as an Alternative to State Action, supra note 3; Note, The Desegrcgation of Private
Schools: Is Section 1981 the Answer?, supra note 3; 11 Hous. L. RLv. 691 (1974); 7 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 634 (1974); 45 Miss. L.J. 246 (1974); 42 U. CrN. L. REV. 767 (1973); 122 U. R%.
L. Rev. 471 (1973); 8 U. RIcH. L. REV. 285 (1974); 26 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (1973).
51. In another pending private school case the school has stipulated that it has "no
plan or purpose of exclusiveness other than race," or in effect that it is not "truly
private." See Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Civil No. 73-1313 (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 6,
1973). The school has, however, raised a freedom of religion defense for its discrimination.
See pp. 1461-62 infra.
On May 28, 1975, Judge Eaton rendered a decision on the § 1981 and religion isues
in favor of the plaintiffs in an oral opinion. Further proceedings were scheduled to
determine the remedies to be ordered. See Tampa Tribune, Ma-y 29, 1975, at 10-A, col. 1.
52. See note 45 supra.
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overall admissions policy of the school. 53 If so, the court's action would
effectively eliminate the "truly private" defense left open in Sullivan
and Tillman by merging it with the primary issue of whether an ex-
clusion based solely on race had occurred. Following this approach,
the court of appeals held even more unequivocally that an explicit
racial exclusion by any private school would violate the statute. 4 In
53. The opinion stated:
Although both schools claim to have strictly established criteria for enrollment, the
end result of their admission policies as applied to both Colin and Michael [the black
plaintiffs] evidences no "plan or purpose of exclusiveness" for selection of students
"other than race."... [citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park].
363 F. Supp. at 1204 (last emphasis in original). But see id.: "[T]he opportunity to attend
these schools was open to every white child." (emphasis added).
A conclusion that the schools were not "truly private" based on the overall admissions
policies might have been appropriate. The fact that the schools excluded some potential
white applicants through academic and other requirements would not make them neces-
sarily "truly private." In both Sullivan and Tillman some potential white applicants
were excluded by geographic residency requirements and a requirement of formal board
or membership approval. 396 U.S. at 234; 410 U.S. at 438. In Tillman there was a ceiling
on the total number of memberships. 410 U.S. at 438. Yet neither club was sufficiently
exclusive to be "truly private." See Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333,
1336 (2d Cir. 1974) (club with 110 families out of 2300 in community and requirement of
committee approval of applicants not "truly private"). The court could hold that the
schools' admissions requirements did not reflect sufficient social exclusiveness to make
them "truly private." Also the fact that the schools advertised to the general public
could be given substantial weight. See United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 376
(E.D. La. 1969); note 12 supra.
54. The court of appeals majority opinion stated:
It is contended here... that § 1981 confers no right of action unless the contract
denied the aggrieved person was open to all white people.... It is ... true that ad-
mission to the school is not open to all white people because there are academic,
financial and other restrictions upon admission. Within the qualified class, however,
there is no other limitation upon the admission of white applicants up to the
school's capacity.
We may not read § 1981 so restrictively as the schools would have us to do it. The
school may not refuse with impunity to accept an otherwise qualified black applicant
simply because it declines to admit unqualified white applicants. The section is
violated as long as the basis of exclusion is racial, for it is then clear that the black
applicant is denied a contractual right which would have been granted to him if he
had been white.
McCrary v. Runyon, No. 72-2348 (4th Cir., Apr. 15, 1975), slip opinion at 10-I1. This
passage could be taken to mean that "truly private" schools are subject to § 1981, thus
answering the question left open in Tillman and Sullivan with regard to clubs. The only
passage which deals with the "truly private" issue, however, evidences the same misap-
plication of that test which the district court seems to have employed:
Indeed, § 1981 does not purport to reach all private associations. It reaches only those
which evidence "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" other than race. Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, supra. Private associations having non-racial criteria for the
selection of members may apply their criteria, even if it results in a disproportionate
impact upon the members of one race. It is only when blacks are excluded because
they are black, or denied a right to contract which would be granted were they
white, that § 1981 is violated.
Slip opinion at 14 (emphasis added). The court seems to take the Sullivan test as determin-
ing only whether racial discrimination has taken place. Cf. pp. 1449-50 supra; note 53
supra. The court also seems incorrect in citing Sullivan for the proposition that § 1981
reaches only groups with "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness." Sullivan and Tillman
specifically left open the possibility that § 1981 might reach groups with such exclusive-
ness. See note 46 supra.
The court could have reached the same result by holding explicitly that even groups
which are "truly private" are subject to § 1981 or that the "truly private" distinction is
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eliminating the possibility that some "truly private" schools could con-
tinue legally to discriminate on the basis of race, the court of appeals
in this case necessarily became the first to face squarely the conflict
between the Thirteenth Amendment legislation and associational in-
terests.55
III. Section 1981 and Group Rights: The Limits of Present Law
The conflict caused by the application of § 1981 to private groups
raises the question of the legal status of the right to discriminate
claimed by these groups. If they could cite no significant legal doc-
trine supporting their discrimination, the courts could apply § 1981
with full vigor. Conversely, if that discrimination was clearly pro-
tected by congressional passage in 1964 of the private club exemption
or by the Constitution, these groups could be routinely exempted
from § 1981. But the law supporting either of these propositions is
far from conclusive. The courts therefore cannot rely on existing legal
doctrine to escape the ultimate task of formulating new doctrine recon-
ciling the conflicting constitutional principles.
A. The Private Club Exemption as an Implied Partial Repeal
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
If the exemption in the 1964 Act of "private clubs and other estab-
lishments not in fact open to the public" also applied to the 1866
Act, clubs and schools which could meet that test could continue to
discriminate until new Thirteenth Amendment or state police power 0
inapplicable where schools rather than clubs are involved. Alternatively, the court could
have decided the case narrowly, finding the schools not "truly private" and avoiding much
of the concern for associational interests by leaving the possibility open that more
exclusive schools could escape § 1981. See note 53 supra.
55. The majority and dissenting opinions represent the first actual application of
several of the legal and policy arguments discussed herein. See notes 76, 77, 81, 87, 95,
121, 144, 146 infra.
56. The states have recently indicated increasing interest in moving against private
club discrimination. A Maine statute prohibits discrimination by holders of state licenses
to dispense "food, liquor or any service," corporations chartered under Maine law, and
corporations authorized to do business in the state. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1301-A
(Supp. 1974). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 133 (Smith-Hurd 1944); N.M. Sr,T-. ANN.
§ 46-10-13.1 (Supp. 1973). The refusal of the Maine State Liquor Commission to renew the
liquor licenses of 15 Elks lodges was upheld in B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 297
A.2d 607 (Me. 1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 924 (1973). The opinion has been criticized
for ignoring the possibility that by requiring a waiver of associational freedom the
statute imposes an unconstitutional condition on the issuance of licenses. See 7 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1069, 1074-75 (1973). This issue has been overlooked in many similar cases. See
pp. 1463-64 infra. In future cases, however, Ingraham might be distinguishable because
it involved the unique power of the state under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate
liquor use. Cf. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (state power to prohibit in bars
sexual displays otherwise protected as First Amendment expression). See Note, The Scope
of Permissible State Interference with Racial Discrimination by Private Fraternal Organ-
izations, 4 RuT.-CAMI. L.J. 338, 353-60 (1973); 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1069, 1081-82 (1973).
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legislation57 brought them within the reach of antidiscrimination re-
quirements. The argument is a plausible one which has been sus-
tained in court. The lower courts in both Sullivans and Tillman59 re-
fused to apply the 1866 Act because they found the organizations to
be bona fide private clubs. The court of appeals in Tillman specif-
ically held that the private club exemption "of necessity operates as
an exception to the Act of 1866 in any case where that Act prohibits
the same conduct which is saved as lawful by the terms of the 1964
Act." 16 0 The court's conclusion has received support in the commentary
on the case,"' but, as noted above, the Supreme Court specifically re-
fused to consider this question.62
While the conclusion that the private club exemption repealed part
of the broad scope of the 1866 Act is plausible, it is hardly beyond
dispute. The case law on implied repeals generally requires a showing
that the two provisions are in irreconcilable conflict and that the
intent of the legislature was for repeal. 3 Since the broad sweep of
the 1866 Act was not known to the legislators in 1964, conscious in-
tent to limit the earlier act did not exist. 4 Determining whether Con-
57. A plaintiff might bring a civil suit against a group exempt from § 1981 on the
basis of the Thirteenth Amendment alone. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (damages recoverable for violation of
the Fourth Amendment on the strength of the amendment alone). See Larson, supra
note 3, at 505. But a plaintiff might find it impossible to establish that private group
discrimination amounts to "slavery or involuntary servitude" or a vestige thereof without
the kind of congressional finding to that effect relied on in Jones.
58. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). The opinion of the
Virginia trial court in Sullivan is unreported, but the U.S. Supreme Court opinion
specifically referred to that court's finding and reversed it. Id. at 236.
59. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971).
60. 451 F.2d at 1214. The majority opinion by Judge Haynsworth drew a vigorous
dissent from Judge Butzner on the grounds that the association was not a bona fide
private club. He felt the implied repeal question was therefore irrelevant. id. at 1222-25.
In dissenting from the denial of a rehearing en banc, two other judges agreed and ob-
jected in addition to the holding on implied repeal when the question had not been
briefed and argued. Id. at 1225.
61. See Note, Private Clubs: The Right to Discriminate in Admissions Policies, 34 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 447 (1973); See generally Note, Private Clubs Expressly Excepted from the
Coverage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Constitute an Exemption from the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 6 GA. L. REv. 813, 821 (1972).
62. 410 U.S. at 438-39. The district court in Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc.,
363 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. McCrary v.
Runyon, No. 73-2348 (4th Cir., Apr. 15, 1975), slip opinion at 32-33, however, rejected the
implied repeal argument with no explanation. The court of appeals did not mention the
specific issue, although the dissenting opinion noted that the Congress did not extend thelegislation of 1964 to cover private schools.
63. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). As a general rule, repeals
by implication are "not favored." United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
The parallel question of implied repeal of § 1981 by the employment discrimination
provisions was considered in Note, Is Section 1981 Modified by Title V"II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964?, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1223.
64. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 31 n.14, Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In hearings on the act, §§ 1981-82 were men-
tioned, however, as at least prohibiting state-sanctioned discrimination in places of public
accommodation. See Hearings on S. 1732 before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 134 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Prouty and Att'y Gen. Kennedy).
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gress would have limited the act if they had this knowledge would
be highly speculative. 5
Because of this special circumstance, a clear irreconcilable conflict
between the two acts is probably necessary to constitute implied re-
peal. An irreconcilable conflict exists only if the private club ex-
emption must be interpreted as making discrimination by private
establishments lawful. 66 However, it is at least equally plausible to
read the exemption merely as a definition of the scope of the remedies
provided by the 1964 Act.07 No language in the act specifically singles
out any private discrimination which "shall be lawful." In addition,
a saving clause was included, providing that "nothing in this sub-
chapter shall preclude any individual . . . from asserting any right
based on any other Federal or State law not inconsistent with this
subchapter ... ."6 Nonetheless, since only laws which are "not incon-
sistent" are saved, the correct meaning of the private club exemption
still must be determined. 69 The legislative history of the private club
exemption is sparse, supporting neither interpretation conclusively.70
The argument for implied repeal is hindered by the track record
of the same argument with regard to other portions of the recent civil
rights legislation. In Jones the Court rejected the suggestion that limi-
tations in the 1968 Fair Housing Act worked to limit the scope of
§ 1982. The Court rejected the notion that the 1968 Act should su-
65. It is true that Congress, thinking it was writing on a clean slate, chose not to
reach private group discrimination. But from the legislative history, it is virtually im-
possible to determine whether the dominant intent was positively to protect private
group discrimination or to facilitate a swift solution in the public accommodations area
by withholding consideration of this more problematic area until a later date. See notes
9, 10 supra. Viewed differently, even though there may have been insufficient support
to attack private group discrimination in the 1964 Congress, this does not mean that
there would have been enough support to limit § 1981 if it had then been determined
to reach private discrimination. Cf. Note, supra note 63, at 1235: "Had Congress been
aware of the existence of a section 1981 action [against employment discriminationi.
necessary votes could probably not have been mustered to repeal or modify that statute."
The need to agonize over exactly what Congress meant to do in 1964 is lessened by the
fact that regardless of the decision on implied repeal, Congress retains the power to
amend or repeal the 1866 Act. This possibility was noted in some of the comment sparked
by Jones. See Larson, supra note 3, at 510 & n.78. Failure to amend §§ 1981-82 suggests
approval of the direction taken in recent judicial opinions.
66. See p. 1453 supra.
67. The exemption uses the phrase "the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply
to .... See Note, Constitutional Law-Private Club Discrimination, supra note 3, at 604
& n.49 (the exemption is not a "license to discriminate: rather it is a directive that the
remedy for discrimination is not to be had under that particular federal law").
68. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oa-6(b) (1970).
69. See Note, Private Clubs: The Right to Discriminate in Admissions Policies, supra
note 61, at 450-51.
70. See note 65 supra. At one point Sen. Humphrey, one of the floor managers, in-
dicated that the exemptions reflected a desire to deal only with major problems. See note
10 supra. On another day he said: "I do not believe there should be a federal law which
provides that a private club should be managed this way, or managed that way." 110
CoNe. REc. 6008 (1964).
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persede § 1982 entirely because of "the vast differences" in the reme-
dies and operative effects of the two acts. 7 ' The courts of appeals have
uniformly rejected the contention that limitations in the employment
discrimination provisions of the 1964 Act limit § 1981.72 And in
Sullivan the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the 1866
Act was completely superseded by the 1964 public accommodations
statute, adopting the reasons given in Jones regarding the 1968 Act.73
Taken together these cases amount to a substantial body of precedent
disfavoring the proposition that the legislation of the 1960's worked
a repeal of that passed a century earlier.
B. A Constitutional Right to Discriminate?
The difficulty of resolving the conflict raised by the application of
§ 1981 to private groups might be avoided if the courts could cite
definitive law establishing a constitutional right for these groups to
71. 392 U.S. at 415-17. The Court also referred to a saving clause in the 1968 Act.
Id. at 416 n.20. See 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (1970). The value of Jones as precedent on the implied
repeal question regarding the 1964 Act is limited, however, by the Court's additional
reliance in Jones on the fact that the potential for a reformulation of § 1982 by the
Supreme Court had been brought to the attention of the Congress before the 1968
legislation was passed. 392 U.S. at 415-17.
72. See cases cited in note 37 supra. Several circuits have rejected the argument that
a complaint must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
as required by Title VII to give the court jurisdiction in a § 1981 case. See Gresham v.
Chambers, 501 F.2d 687, 690-91 (2d Cir. 1974); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500,
503-04 (6th Cir. 1974); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 996 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. ITT, 438 F.2d 757, 762-63 (3d Cir. 1971). But see Penn v.
Schlesinger, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.LV.
3310 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1974) (remedies available before Civil Service Commission under
Commission regulations must be exhausted before § 1981 action can be maintained against
federal officials). One circuit has imposed a requirement for a showing of a "reasonable
excuse" for a failure to exhaust EEOC remedies. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of
Int'l Harvester, 427 F.2d 476, 487 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). This re-
quirement has been rejected in the other circuits, and recently the Seventh Circuit
expressed a willingness to abandon it. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l
Harvester, 502 F.2d 1309, 1315 (7th Cir. 1974) (on appeal after remand).
Section 1981 has also made possible actions which would have been barred by the
special statute of limitations in Title VII. See Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621,
621-22 (8th Cir. 1972); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Constr. Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th
Cir. 1971). See also Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 648 (5th Cir.
1974) (filing complaint with EEOC tolls statute of limitations applicable to § 1981);
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
1421 (1975) (same, but defendant can raise the defense of laches).
See generally Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of
the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, sulna note 3, at 480-85.
73. The Court cited specifically the saving clause and the administrative machinery
provided in the new act. 396 U.S. at 237-38. That this holding in Sullivan did not,
however, conclusively determine the question of the application of the private club
exemption as a limitation on the 1866 Act is evident from the Court's decision four
years later in Tillman. The Tillman Court specifically stated that the question had not
been answered in Sullivan and that it was equally unnecessary to answer it in that case.
410 U.S. at 438-39.
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discriminate. An examination of the relevant cases, however, reveals
that no such right clearly exists.
1. The Dicta
Dicta in several Supreme Court cases have indicated that private
groups may have a constitutionally protected right to discriminate.
In distinguishing public accommodations from private groups in his
concurring opinion in Bell v. Maryland, Justice Goldberg stated:
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the
constitutional right of every person to close his home or club to
any person or to choose his social intimates and business partners
solely on the basis of personal prejudices including race. These
and other rights pertaining to privacy and private association are
themselves constitutionally protected liberties. 4
The dicta in Bell and other Fourteenth Amendment cases might better
be characterized as explanations for the limited reach of that amend-
ment than as carefully thought out descriptions of private activity
absolutely immune from government proscriptions of discrimination
in the future. During the period when the major thrust of the devel-
oping civil rights law was the Fourteenth Amendment, this associa-
tional freedom might have been thought of as deriving automatically
from the "state action" limitation of that amendment75 Therefore
these dicta may have lost their validity when the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was specifically held to reach private discrimination in 1968.
That development has brought this freedom of association into direct
conflict with prohibitions on private discrimination. If freedom of
association is to prevail, more affirmative constitutional support will
74. 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964). Justice Douglas's opinion relied on the home as the
locus of that right:
The home of course is the essence of privacy, in no way dedicated to public use, in
no way extending an invitation to the public.... The facts of these sit-in cases have
little resemblance to any institution of property which we customarily associate with
privacy.
Id. at 253. See also Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 274 (1963) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
75. Note, supra note 56, at 351. This view was expressed by Justice Harlan in his
concurring opinion in Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963):
[The state action] limitation on the scope of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment serves several vital functions in our system. Underlying the cases in-
volving an alleged denial of equal protection by ostensibly private action is a clash
of competing constitutional claims of a high order: liberty and equality.... This
liberty would be overridden, in the name of equality, if the strictures of the Amend-
ment were applied to governmental and private action without distinction.
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be needed than the negative implications drawn from the Fourteenth
Amendment. In a case actually presenting this conflict, the Court
might draw the right to discriminate more narrowly than the dicta
suggest.
Nonetheless, the Court has persisted in making the same sorts of
statements in Fourteenth Amendment cases decided since Jones.76
These later statements may suggest that some members of the Supreme
Court would hold that private groups do have a constitutional right
to discriminate, but they hardly amount to binding precedent for
such a conclusion.77 If such a right exists, it would have a much
stronger basis in the decisions of cases in which the right of free asso-
ciation was directly at issue.
76. In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973), the Court referred to discrimina-
tion by private schools receiving state aid:
Such private bias is not barred by the Constitution, nor does it invoke any sanction
of laws, but neither can it call on the Constitution for material aid from the State.
(emphasis added). The italicized phrase could be taken as dictum on the reach of §
1981. See McCrary v. Runyon, No. 73-2348 (4th Cir., Apr. 15, 1975), slip opinion at 43
(Russell, Field, and Widener, JJ., concurring and dissenting). The suggestion that private
school discrimination is constitutionally protected was weakened, however, by another
statement in the opinion. To the schools' argument that if they had a right to dis-
criminate, the state could not require a waiver of that right as a condition of state aid,
the Court responded:
Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom
of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded
affirmative constitutional protections.
Id. at 470. Elsewhere in the opinion the Court acknowledged congressional power to
reach private discrimination under the Thirteenth Amendment and stated specifically
that the right of the schools to discriminate per se was not an issue in the case. Id. at
457-58, 470.
In his dissent in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972), Justice
Douglas (joined by Justice Marshall) stated:
My view of the First Amendment and the related guarantees of the Bill of Rights is
that they create a zone of privacy which precludes government from interfering with
private clubs or groups.... Government may not tell a man or woman who his as-
sociates must be. The individual may be as selective as he desires.
The balance of the opinion made clear Douglas's view that these rights to discriminate,
however important they might be, disappeared when the club accepted a liquor license
from the state of Pennsylvania.
Recently, in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), the Supreme Court
quoted approvingly Douglas's Moose Lodge dictum, but countered it with the statement
in Norwood that a right to discriminate was not entitled to "affirmative constitutional
protection." The case held that the grant by the city of exclusive use of some city recrea-
tional facilities to discriminating private schools was properly enjoined as violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but that on the basis of the record the grant of nonexclusive use
of such facilities did not violate that amendment. The decision with respect to non-
exclusive use rested on the conclusion that there was no violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than on a constitutional right of schools both to discriminate and
to use the facilities. See also Wesley v. Savannah, 294 F. Supp. 698, 701 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
77. The dissenting judges in McCrary v. Runyon, No. 73-2348 (4th Cir., Apr. 15, 1975),
slip opinion at 29, 35-36, 42-43, would have held § 1981 inapplicable to private schools
primarily on the strength of the statements in Norwood, Moose Lodge, and Gilmore. The
majority, on the other hand, distinguished Norwood and ignored the other cases. Id. at
14-15.
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2. Legal Doctrines Which Might Support a
Right to Discriminate
Freedom of association. Freedom of association78 evolved to protect
the ability of an individual to join79 with others for the expression or
promotion of political ideas.8 0 This freedom of association has little
to do with a right to exclude others on the basis of race. 8' Indeed, the
right to exclude arguably impairs the freedom to associate of the per-
son who wants to join.8 2 Most schools and social clubs are apolitical
and would find it difficult to prove that they require a right to dis-
criminate for the purposes of political expression. 3
Right of privacy. Because the freedom of association cases did not
deal with the exclusion question, some commentators have suggested
that the question of a right to discriminate could be better concep-
tualized as deriving from a right of privacy.8 4 Supreme Court cases
have established this right to freedom from government intrusion in
78. Freedom of association was first formally recognized in NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958), where the Court struck down a state statute compelling the disclosure of
membership lists. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Gibson v. Florida
Legis. Investigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See generally Emerson, Freedom of Association and
Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
79. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the word "association" frequently was
used to mean an act rather than a group, and the right identified by the decision was
referred to as "freedom to engage in association" and "freedom to associate" in addition
to freedom of association. Id. at 460-61.
80. See Note, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and
Right to Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1195, 1197. Freedom of association may have no
status at all independent of freedom of expression. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 283 n.1 (1967) (white, J., dissenting). But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
483 (1965) (dictum suggesting that the freedom of association includes the right to join
nonpolitical groups also).
81. McCrary v. Runyon, No. 73-2348 (4th Cir., Apr. 15, 1975), slip opinion at 12. See
Note, supra note 80, at 1209. One can imagine special cases in which the exclusion of
blacks might be necessary to preserve the freedom of expression of a bona fide political
group. A White Citizens' Council, for example, might have a right to resist destruction
of the organization by massive demands for membership by blacks. But the potential for
such cases does not require a blanket exemption of all private groups from § 1981. The
courts would probably have no greater difficulty patrolling the frontier between social
clubs and political associations than they have now on the boundary between private
clubs and public accommodations. See note 12 supra. Qualifying as a bona fide political
association might require a showing of regular political activity such as lobbying, litigating
or letter writing and regular participation by a substantial proportion of the member-
ship in these activities.
One could argue that the act of excluding blacks from any association contains elements
of expression. But such acts involve "conduct" rather than "pure expression," and are
therefore entitled to less protection from state regulation. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 555 (1965); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 60-61
(1967). The state interest underlying § 1981 could be held to outweigh the interest in
free expression involved. See p. 1464 infra.
82. See Note, supra note 80, at 1208.
83. See Note, Freedom of Association: Constitutional Right or Judicial Technique, 46
VA. L. REV. 730, 752 (1960); Comment, State Universities and the Discriminatory Fratern-
ity: A Constitutional Analysis, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 169, 187 (1961); note 110 infra.
84. See Emerson, supra note 78, at 20; Note, supra note 80, at 1209.
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specific situations involving the family, procreation, and the home,sa
but in several cases the Court has specifically refused to extend the
right beyond these limited contexts.3 6 Therefore, while the concept
of .a zone of privacy might be the best foundation upon which a
constitutional right to discriminate could be based, no decision has
yet established that right as a matter of law. 7
Parental rights to control the education of their children. In the
private school context, the claim by parents or school officials of a
right to discriminate based on freedom of association or privacy would
require that they assert these rights on behalf of the children in the
school. The adults might find it difficult to prove that the children
share a prejudice as intense as their own. 8 And even in the face of
such proof, a court might note that racial prejudice is based on ig-
norance and discount the expressed associational preferences of chil-
dren because of their age and capacity. In this sense, making inte-
gration possible through the use of § 1981 might be seen as part of the
educational mission of the state,89 comparable to curriculum require-
ments which private schools must meet in order for the students to
satisfy compulsory school attendance laws. The argument against such
a result would have a stronger basis in a direct constitutional right
of parents to control the education of their children.
85. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to obtain abortion); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmarried couples to acquire contraceptives); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess obscene material in the home); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couples to use contraceptives). See
generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUm. L. REy. 1410 (1974).
86. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). The right to view obscene materials
in the home identified in Stanley has been held not to include the right to view them
with other consenting adults in a theatre open to the public, Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1973), or to import them for private use in the home, United
States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126-29 (1973). Neither of
these decisions was unanimous, however. See, e.g., id. at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The concept of a privileged zone within the home has been held not to preclude a
restrictive zoning ordinance limiting most of the available housing in a community to
conventional families -related by blood, adoption or marriage. Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See Note, The Constitutional Right to Privacy: An Exanina-
tion, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 263, 279-83 (1974).
The lower courts have limited the right of privacy in a variety of contexts. See gen-
erally Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv.
670, 706-70 (1973).
87. The majority in McCrary v. Runyon, No. 73-2348 (4th Cir., Apr. 15, 1975), slip
opinion at 13, distinguished the privacy cases because they involved "certain instances
when only a few people are involved in activity unintended for the public view [and in
which] it is more than likely or inevitable that there is some plan or purpose of ex-
clusiveness other than race."
88. "Young children do not discriminate against each other; that is a characteristic of
maturity." Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 517 (1925).
89. The appearance of curriculum materials on the problem of race relations suggests
that some public schools have adopted the improvement of race relations as a goal of
their programs. See generally R. RATCLIFFE, S. BAUGnER, R. BONAs et al, LAw IN A NE-W
LAND (1972).
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In Meyer v. Nebraska"° and Pierce v. Society of Sisters9 ' the Su-
preme Court suggested such a right in striking down state statutes
impairing the ability of parents to obtain educational services from
private schools. Both decisions relied on notions of substantive due
process92 which protected the rights of parents "long freely enjoyed." 93
For several reasons these cases might not protect discrimination by
private schools. The harm involved in those cases was the foreclosure
of access to alternative educational programs offered in the private
schools. Section 1981 would foreclose such opportunity only to the
extent that a racially exclusionary admissions policy was part of the
"educational message" 4 of the school.9 5 Racism and the desirability
of segregation are relatively simple concepts which arguably could be
communicated to children adequately at home without the necessity
for a private school. More significantly, both Meyer and Pierce recog-
nized the possibility that state interests could outweigh parental in-
terests in some situations.90 Perhaps the best evidence that parental
rights do not include the right to segregated schools is the fact that
several northern and western states have statutes which prohibit dis-
crimination in all or some private schools.9 7 Some of these statutes have
90. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a statute prohibiting the teaching in any school
of foreign language to students below the ninth grade).
91. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (enjoining the enforcement of an Oregon statute requiring all
parents to enroll their children in public schools).
92. 262 U.S. at 399; 268 U.S. at 518.
93. 262 U.S. at 403.
94. CI. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973) (state cannot aid discriminatory
schools as it does religious schools because discrimination is an inherent part of the
.'educational message" of the former).
95. The majority in McCrary v. Runyon, No. 73-2348 (4th Cir., Apr. 15, 1975), slip
opinion at 12-13, did not even recognize this possibility, finding that "[n]othing in § 1981
impedes parents in their exercise of a choice of a private school presenting ideas or having
educational methods or practices which are not available in the public schools."
96. 262 U.S. at 401-03; 268 U.S. at 516.
97. See IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5902(10); 67-5909(6) (Burns 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 22-9-
1-2(a), 22-9-1-3() (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01 Subd. 20, 363.03 Subd. 5 (Supp.
1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 64-305(4), 64-306(6) (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-5(1) (Supp. 1974); S. DAN. COMPIILED LAws ANN. §§ 20-13-1(11), 20-13-22 (Supp. 1974);
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2 (1966). Several of these statutes are based on the Compre-
hensive Anti-Discrimination Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (1966). See also MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151C, § 1(b) (Supp.
1974) (schools accepting admissions from the general public which are not "distinctly
private"); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-4 (McKinney Supp. 1974) (school which holds itself out
to the public); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.91.010 (1961) (schools of special instruction,
nursery schools). In keeping with judicial decisions in the area of school aid, several state
statutes also prohibit discrimination by schools receiving state aid. See, e.g., id.
Several other states have limited their antidiscrimination statutes primarily to post.
secondary and vocational schools, with some states specifically altering the Model Act to
this effect. See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-302(13), 24-34-306(f) (1973); ILL. ANN. STT.
ch. 16V, §§ 14.40, 18a (Smith-Hurd 1972); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.320(2), 163.340(6)
(Supp. 1974); OR. REv. STAT. § 345.240 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5003(1) (1974);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-35-2(11), 34-35-6(f) (Supp. 1973). See also N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 313(2)
(McKinney 1969).
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been in existence for a number of years, and the consensus of the
commentators, in the absence of any definitive case raising the point,
has been that the statutes are constitutional.98
Free exercise of religion. If a group could show that the exclusion
of blacks was required by the group's religion, it could base a case
for an exemption from § 1981 on the First Amendment's ban on laws
prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Many private schools or-
ganized in response to public school integration are affiliated with
Protestant churches."0 At least initially these schools might present
Free Exercise Clause defenses to § 1981, claiming that they are ex-
ercising a religious belief in the separation of the races or in white
supremacy. 00
The chance that such claims will be made does not make every-
thing short of a blanket exemption for all private church-affiliated
schools unworkable. If the court determined that the group was using
religion as a subterfuge for practices based on political or social ide-
ology, the discrimination could readily be held beyond the protection
of the Free Exercise Clause.' 0 ' But even a sincere religious basis might
not sustain the discrimination. Although freedom to believe is abso-
lute, freedom to act on that belief is protected only when those acts
have a substantial relationship to fundamental tenets of the religion .102
The courts will not question the truth or desirability of the religious
The public accommodations statutes of a number of states employ general definitions
which cover enterprises offering services to the public. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(7)
(1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4501 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(h) (Supp. 1974);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553-8 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-2G (1974);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1401(1) (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1451(c) (Supp.
1974). These statutes might be construed to cover many private schools. See Vantine v.
City of Tulsa, 518 P.2d 316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (preschool which advertised to
general public). A number of such statutes, however, exclude establishments which are
in their nature distinctly private. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441 (1974); lOWA CODE
ANN. § 601A.2-10 (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 314.020, 314.040 (Vernon Supp. 1975);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-133, 20-138 (Supp. 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3(j) (Supp.
1974); Wv. STAT. ANN. § 6-83.1 (Supp. 1973). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (Supp.
1974); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292-9 (McKinney 1972). Very exclusive schools might escape the
reach ot such statutes.
98. "There is no record of a state fair educational practices act being invalidated on
federal or state constitutional grounds, and it seems far-fetched to argue that the states
are powerless to forbid discrimination in education." 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N.
DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1402 (student ed. 1967). See
also Fox, Discrimination and Antidiscrimination in Massachusetts Law, 44 B.U.L. REV.
30, 70-71 (1964).
99. Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, supra note 14, at 1447-48 & n.68.
100. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Civil No. 73-1313 (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 6, 1973); note
51 supra.
101. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (granting the Amish sect a
religious exemption from compulsory school attendance laws for children over age 14).
102. See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327, 361-64
(1969).
1461
The Yale Law Journal
belief itself.103 But they will independently determine from the avail-
able evidence, the importance to the exercise of the religion of the
belief which forms the basis of the otherwise legally prohibited prac-
tice.104
The conclusion that school segregation is not a fundamental tenet
in the religion of these groups could be based on several factors. There
may be an absence of significant emphasis on school segregation or
racial separation in the religious literature and programs in these
churches in the past. 0 5 The groups might also find it difficult to prove
that racial separation has a fundamental importance in their religion
because of past acquiescence in the interracial interaction of adults
in jobs, housing, and public accommodations, and of some children
in the public schools. 0 6 The courts might conclude that many, if not
most, of these schools are actually secular despite their church affilia-
tion because their admissions are open to white students from other
churches, denominations or faiths with little inquiry into religious
background, and because significant religious instruction is lacking in
the schools. Finally, even if the threshold showing of a religious prac-
tice of fundamental importance is sustained, such a practice must
yield to a "compelling state interest,"' 07 and abolition of racial dis-
crimination may be such an interest.' 08
Direct precedent for a right to discriminate. In the few cases where
parties have asserted a right to discriminate and the courts have ad-
dressed the argument, that right has not fared well. Courts have up-
held the constitutionality of state laws and regulations prohibiting
103. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
104. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding the application
of the draft laws to persons with a religious objection to the Vietnam war); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding the application of Sunday closing laws to Orthodox
Jews whose stores are closed on Saturday); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(upholding the application of anti-polygamy laws to Mormons); Leary v. United States,
383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (upholding the
application of marihuana laws to Dr. Timothy Leary despite his membership in a Hindu
sect which used the drug in religious practices). See also People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d
716, 725 (1964) (distinguishing Reynolds and creating a religious exemption from the
drug laws for an American Indian sect). See generally Clark, supra note 102, at 361-64.
105. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) ("history of three centuries" as
a religious community).
106. In contrast, in Yoder the Court noted the pervasive separateness of the Amish
community. Id. at 216. Churches affiliated with national Protestant denominations might
well have to explain the existence of integrated affiliated churches in other parts of the
country.
107. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). See, e.g., Linscott v. Millers Falls
Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971) (Seventh Day Adventist's op-
position to contributing to a labor union outweighed by "the congressionally supported
principle of the union shop"); Biklen v. Board of Educ., 333 F. Supp. 902 (N.D.N.Y.
1971), aff'd, 406 U.S. 951 (1972) (personal religious opposition to loyalty oath or affirma-
tion outweighed by state interest in "assuring the fitness and dedication of its teachers").
108. See p. 1464 infra.
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racial discrimination by labor unions'019 and social fraternities at pub-
lic high schools and state universities." 0
The freedom of white citizens to use their governmental instrumen-
talities to provide for schools and other facilities which reflect their
associational preferences was, of course, dramatically restricted by
Brown v. Board of Education"' and its progeny." - A series of cases
have struck down government aid to private schools"13 and clubs" 4
which discriminate. If the discrimination practiced by these groups
was constitutionally protected, requiring the abandonment of that
practice before granting government aid would run afoul of the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions. This doctrine prohibits the gov-
ernment from infringing on constitutional rights by requiring their
109. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). Justice Frankfurter, concurring,
stated:
Certainly the insistence by individuals on their private prejudices as to race, color
or creed, in relations like those now before us, ought not to have a higher constitu-
tional sanction than the determination of a state to extend the area of non-discrimina-
tion beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts.
Id. at 98.
110. See, e.g., Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp.
515 (D. Colo. 1966). This court specifically held that "freedom of association" cases did
not "uphold the right of association as applied to a social fraternity." Id. at 526. See
generally Comment, supra note 83.
111. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112. In Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), the Court invalidated the use
of freedom-of-choice plans and held that each school board had an affirmative duty to
desegregate its schools. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971), the Court authorized the lower courts to employ racial quotas, busing, and
radical alterations of school attendance zones to remedy past discrimination by achieving
actual integration.
113. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (textbooks provided to private
school students). See generally Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, supra note
14, at 1440.
See also Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub non. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971) (denying tax exempt status to discriminatory private schools on the
basis of a construction of the word "charitable" in the tax provisions). But see Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.ll (1974) (noting that this issue had not been
decided by the Supreme Court in a "truly adversary controversy" and suggesting that only
limited weight should be given to Coit v. Green). This raises doubt as to the validity of
all of the tax exemption cases. See note 114 infra.
114. The states have never afforded private clubs the kind of direct aid which was
extended to private schools. Recently, however, a series of Fourteenth Amendment cases
have struck down indirect aid in the form of tax exemptions to private clubs which
discriminate. See Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Oregon State Elks Ass'n v. Falkenstein, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973)(state property and corporate excise tax exemptions to fraternal organizations); Mc-
Glotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (federal income tax exemptions to
fraternal orders); Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (state
property tax exemptions).
None of the decisions recognized an associational interest. The McGlotten case dis-
tinguished fraternal orders from other nonprofit social clubs on the basis of differences
in the tax laws applicable to them. 338 F. Supp. at 457-59. Professor Bittker has sug-
gested that the reasoning of the court was not sound in this regard. He argues that rely-
ing only on tax law to differentiate between groups which may discriminate and those
which may not would logically lead to the application of antidiscrimination requirements
to every individual and group in the country. See Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil
Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 86-87 (1972).
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waiver as a condition for the receipt of a benefit.11 Yet, few decisions
have even considered the possibility of such a conflict.,, One court
expressed a willingness to order the desegregation of private schools
if Alabama's aid to such schools continued." 7 In what is perhaps the
best discussion of the issue of an unconstitutional condition, the dis-
trict court in Green v. Connally" s concluded that the right to dis-
criminate is not as "fundamental" as freedom of speech, 1" 9 and that
even if it were, it is outweighed by "a compelling government in-
terest in the interdiction of racial discrimination which stands on the
highest constitutional ground.' '1 2 0 Although these cases generally arose
under the Fourteenth Amendment, they have committed the judiciary
to the assignment of a relatively low value to whatever right to dis-
criminate might exist.
C. The Limits of Legal Doctrine
The preceding cases and discussion do not answer the question of
the extent to which private groups have a right to discriminate. In-
stead they indicate that present law provides no unambiguous answer
to this question. The law respects both individual liberty from gov-
115. This doctrine dispenses with the argument that state authority to den) a benefit
entirely includes the allegedly lesser authority to grant it conditioned on the waiver of a
constitutional right. As the size of the government and its largess has grown. the doctrine
has been increasingly invoked. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (condi-
tioning grant of tenure tr state university professor on absence of criticism of superiors
infringes on freedom of speech). Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (conditioning
welfare benefits on residency period infringes on right of interstate travel); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (conditioning allowance of tax exemption on loyalty oath
infringes on freedom of speech). See generally O'Neill, Unconstitutional Conditions: Wel-
fare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439
(1968); note 56 supra.
116. Courts which have mentioned defendants' arguments about rights to discriminate
usually have remarked simply that there is no right to discriminate and receive govern-
ment aid at the same time. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462, 470 (1973);
Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486, 492-93 (4th Cir. 1964) (en banc).
117. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 478 (M.D. Ala.) (three-
judge court), affd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
118. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd sub nora. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
See note 113 supra.
119. The court found it necessary to distinguish Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958), which invalidated a statute denying a tax exemption to veterans who refused to
take a loyalty oath. The court relied somewhat on the chilling effect involved in Speiser
which was not likely to be present in this case. 330 F. Supp. at 1166-67. That a right to
discriminate is not so important that its compulsory waiver might be deemed an un-
constitutional condition was also suggested by the statement in Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973), that discrimination "has never been accorded affirmative con-
stitutional protections." See note 76 supra.
120. 330 F. Supp. at 1167. The court in McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448,
460 (D.D.C. 1972), relied on Green as authority suggesting a public policy against seg-
regated clubs. Professor Bittker has criticized this as a shift from a rather clear policy
against segregated education to a more questionable one against segregated clubs. See
Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 114, at 76-77.
1464
Section 1981 and Private Groups
emnment intrusion and racial equality through the operation of law.
The choice between these two values has already been made in the
contexts of the home on the one hand, and public, commercial busi-
ness on the other. Private clubs and schools possess a unique mix
of the characteristics of these two institutions. In this middle ground,
the legal system as yet has neither made the necessary choice nor
committed itself. A court called on to make this decision, therefore,
can exercise a relatively wide degree of discretion. 121 In these circum-
stances, making the decision will amount to an act of policymaking.
IV. A Right to Discriminate: The Policy Considerations
The process of creating a policy defining permissible racial dis-
crimination by individuals in groups requires a weighing of strong
opposing interests. The process of assigning values to important com-
peting interests and attempting to strike an optimal balance between
them depends ultimately upon the subjective value judgments of the
decisionmakers. But before assigning values and balancing, an effort
must be made to identify the conflicting interests and to predict the
effects that alternative resolutions will have on those interests. Be-
cause of the high costs of preserving private club and school dis-
crimination in the face of § 1981's broad sweep, the optimal protection
to be afforded these competing interests might be something less than
the blanket exclusions which were unquestioned before 1968. The
following analysis will examine the competing interests and suggest
ways of limiting the impact of § 1981 short of a blanket exemption.
A. The Costs of Protecting Private Discrimination
1. The Perpetuation of "Badges and Incidents of Slavery"
The grant of congressional authority under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to eliminate badges and vestiges of slavery was based on the
proposition that the freed men could not achieve full free citizenship
if they had to make their way in a society cluttered with monuments
to their former condition of servitude.12 2 The badge of slavery iden-
121. The recent decision in McCrary v. Runyon, No. 73-2348 (4th Cir., Apr. 15, 1975)
is illustrative. The four-judge majority, concluding that § 1981 should reach explicit
racial discrimination, distinguished past cases on freedom of association, right of privacy
and parental rights in a manner similar to that described above. See notes 81, 87, 95
supra. The three-judge dissent, concluding that § 1981 should not reach private schools,
emphasized the dicta in past Supreme Court -cases. See notes 76, 77 supra.
122. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968).
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tified in Jones was racial discrimination-practices based on the asser-
tion that significant variations in the qualities of human beings can
be predicted by race alone. Today the concept of inherent racial in-
equality survives in the bylaws12 and admissions policies124 of private
clubs and schools which can reject the black applicant with no more
justification than "no blacks allowed." The use of racial classifications
is psychologically harmful to minority group members?25 These
"badges of slavery" are also signals to other members of the white ma-
jority that racial prejudice has not yet become too discredited to ex-
press openly. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 presents an opportunity to
eliminate some of these remaining vestiges of slavery which would be
lost by a court decision broadly protecting private discrimination.
2. Judicial Validation of Racism
In numerous cases over a period of many years the Supreme Court
has emphatically established the proposition that classifications based
on race are irrational and wrongful.126 In Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion 127 the Court found that government approval of such classifica-
tions compounds the harm they cause to minority group members. A
court attempting to define an exemption from § 1981 could not ef-
fectively maintain neutrality regarding the racial discrimination. De-
spite disclaimers in the opinion, a decision legitimating the discrim-
ination practiced by these groups would present the appearance of
government approval of the theory of race inequality.
123. For example, the National Constitution of the Benevolent and Paternal Order
of Elks, art. VI, § 4, provides that in order to be considered for membership an appli-
cant must be "a white male citizen of the United States, of sound mind and body, of
good character, not under the age of 21 years, and a believer in God." N.Y. Times,
Aug. 13, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 9.
124. In Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200, 1202-03 (E.D. Va.
1973), for example, the record contained evidence of several instances in which persons
inquiring by phone were told that no blacks were allowed in the school.
125. The use of racial classifications tends to convince many minority group members
that they actually are inferior. This in turn robs them of the ambition necessary for
advancement. See generally G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES
147-50 (3d ed. 1965). This conclusion, supported by authorities in psychology and soci-
ology in the now-famous footnote 11, led the Supreme Court to hold that separate
schools were inherently incapable of providing equal educational opportunity. Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.ll (1954).
Although the focus has been elsewhere, it should not be overlooked that the use of
racial classifications can be psychologically harmful to majority group members as well.
See G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, supra at 182-87.
126. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1885).
127. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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3. The Denial of Equal Opportunity to Black Citizens
Educational opportunity. As desegregation proceeded under court
in the South, -'2 8 over half a million students fled the public schools
and entered white-only private schools.12 9 These segregation acad-
emies undermine the nation's policy of providing integrated educa-
tional opportunity.130 In many school districts little actual school in-
tegration exists because so few whites remain in the public school
system.131 The result is the perpetuation of dual school systems,132
just as separate and perhaps as inherently unequal as those dismantled
after Brown. The psychological harm to young black students may not
be much less merely because the white schools do not receive affirm-
ative aid from the states.
The rise of the segregation academy also threatens educational op-
portunity for blacks by undermining the public schools. The massive
exodus of students from the public schools in some areas has caused
the loss of state aid, local financial support, and experienced faculty
and staff.' 33 This deterioration of the public school system, coupled
with more drastic measures to achieve racial balance using the few
white students remaining, 34 has often further accelerated the exodus
of white students from the system. Rarely have the remaining blacks
had such an alternative.
The application of § 1981 to private segregation academies would
eliminate their primary reason for existence, the right to discriminate
in the admission of students. While actual integration of these schools
might not be achieved immediately, § 1981 would be a useful tool
for civil rights groups seeking to restore public support for the public
school systems.
Access to private social clubs. Unlike segregation academies, white-
only private social clubs have been a part of American society for
years.' 35 Membership in some clubs can be an important source of
128. The flight to private schools has also occurred in northern cities where deseg-
regation plans have had great impact. See Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (Boston).
129. The estimated enrollment in private schools organized or expanded as a result
of public school desegregation grew from roughly 25,000 in 1966 to approximately 535,000
in 1972. Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, supra note 14, at 1441 & n.44
(1973).
130. That a policy favoring actual integration of the schools exists is evident from
the recent decisions abandoning "color-blindness" in favor of devices to achieve racial
balance in the schools. See note 112 supra.
131. Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, supra note 14, at 1451-52 & nn.
82-83.
132. Id. at 1453.
133. Id. at 1452-53 & un.86-90.
134. Id. at 1452 K- n.85.
135. These clubs take the form of thousands of country clubs, city clubs, athletic
clubs and fraternal orders. See generally Note, supra note 80, at 1186-90.
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business opportunity. Country clubs and downtown clubs are often
the setting for new business contacts and business entertaining. There
is evidence that executive job promotion is often dependent on club
membership. 3 6 In some areas clubs may hold a local monopoly on
a particular type of recreational facility or dining establishment. The
continuance of blanket racial exclusion would deny these advantages
to blacks, regardless of how well they might meet other nonracial
admissions criteria.
4. The Lost Potential for Social Integration
Private schools and private clubs are often indistinguishable in their
operations and ambience from public schools, restaurants, bars, and
pools open to the general public. By instituting a system of selectivity
and paying membership fees or tuition, whites can escape the racial
integration mandated by court decisions and legislation. To the ex-
tent that there is a national policy of promoting integration for its
own sake, this policy is undermined by the maintenance of a system
in which whites can, in effect, purchase the right to maintain segre-
gation. The capacity of § 1981 to bring about integration is rather
limited, however, when compared to the judicial application of the
Fourteenth Amendment for the desegregation of public schools. Sec-
tion 1981 gives the black citizen the "same right" as white citizens
have, but the option of exercising that right remains his. Even if
§ 1981 were applied without qualification to every institution cur-
rently barring access to blacks, the white custodians of those institu-
tions would still possess the full complement of informal social sanc-
tions which could make entry distasteful to blacks.
In many large clubs and private schools, however, the significance
of being unwanted by some of the members may be relatively unim-
portant compared to the benefits of gaining access described above.
Section 1981 can promote actual integration by invalidating restrictive
convenants and bylaws in organizations in which most existing mem-
bers of the group are too indifferent to repeal them voluntarily.
This would allow nonprejudiced group members to invite blacks to
associate with them. Furthermore, local groups could eliminate racial
136. Id. at 1188, 1216-17'- See also Brief for B'nai Brith as Amicus Curiae at 23-28,
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis"407 U.S. 163 (1972); S. Mysliwiec, Regulating Discriminatory
Practices of Private Organizations in Pennsylvania, Jan. 1974 (unpublished Yale Legis-
lative Services report).
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restrictions without the threat of sanctions from affiliated groups else-
where.137
B. The Costs of Restricting Group Freedom to Exclude Blacks
1. Forced Interracial Social Intercourse
The argument against government intervention is based on the no-
tions that individual freedom includes the rights to join voluntarily
with others for any benign purpose, to establish by mutual consent
reasonable rules for governing group activity,138 to extend invitations
to others to join as a matter of unfettered discretion, 13 9 and to leave
the group or disband it at will.'a° Since these "rights" describe actual
behavior that may well predate what are now known as governments,
they are arguably among the "natural" rights which, according to the
Ninth Amendment, the people have not surrendered to their gov-
ernment.' 41
Section 1981 would not completely eliminate discretion in the ad-
mission of new persons to the groups. It would merely prohibit the
use of race to deny admission to blacks. The specific interest threat-
ened is the desire of groups and their members to prevent interracial
social contact. 42 Groups with racial barriers think that they would
137. See Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri State Jr. Chamber of Commerce,
508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975) (suit for preliminary injunction to enjoin the United
States Jaycees from revoking the charter of the Kansas City Jaycees and removing a
convention from Kansas City to another site, alleging that such actions in response to
local chapter's admission of women in violation of national bylaws would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment; injunction denied for lack of state action). Cf. Washington
Branch of Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women v. American Ass'n of Univ. Women, 79 F. Supp.
88 (D.D.C. 1948), aff'd, 175 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (branch affiliate may admit blacks
due to lack of restriction in national constitution or bylaws).
138. See, e.g., Cox v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir.
1942).
139. See, e.g., Burrell v. Michaux, 286 S.W. 176, 181 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926),
a! 'g 273 S.W. 874 (Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ancient Egyptian Arabic
Order of Nobles v. Michaux, 279 U.S. 737 (1929) (segregation of races by limiting mem-
bership to white men may be enforced by a court of equity).
140. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1029, Textile Workers Union of America, 409 U.S. 213,
216 (1972).
141. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.
See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring); Henkin, supra note 85, at 1412-16; Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights...
Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787, 802-12 (1962). But see Pollak, Thomas
I. Emerson, Lawyer and Scholar: Ipse Custodiet Custodes, 84 YALE L.J. 638, 643-47 (1975).
142. Private groups may also feel that any government control over admissions cri-
teria will lead to the ultimate invalidation of other, nonracial criteria and a substantial
lessening of their freedom to choose social intimates. Given the history of the Thirteenth
Amendment and § 1981, however, government intrusion could be explicitly limited to
forbidding the use of race as a criterion. But see note 40 supra.
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find it unpleasant to have to talk to blacks, to see them, to be in
close physical proximity to them, or to have them participate in group
activity. The individual who finds interracial contact unpleasant may
now find it unavoidable in a variety of contexts of daily life. But the
special nature of private groups such as social clubs and schools may
make the infringement of the segregation interests more harmful in
those contexts. The right of a person to select others to invite into
his home on a completely arbitrary basis might be considered a basic
element of liberty.143 It may be desirable to extend this sort of sanc-
tuary from government supervision beyond the home tQ groups like
clubs and schools.
2. Impairment of Parental Control over the
Education of their Children
The application of § 1981 in the private school context would in-
fringe upon the special interest of parents in providing a segregated
educational environment for their children. These parental desires
may stem from several sources. Parents may feel that segregated schools
contribute to the indoctrination of children with racial prejudice. In
addition, parents may think that black children are inherently less
capable of contributing to the academic atmosphere of the classroom
than white children. Fear of social contact within the school leading
to interracial dating and marriage may be a considerable motivating
factor for parents.
The desegregation of public schools, of course, substantially im-
paired parental access to segregated schools. The specific privilege
threatened by § 1981, then, is the ability of parents who are willing
and able to pay both school-supporting taxes and private school tuition
to provide a segregated school for their children. The case for preserv-
ing this system does not draw support from these parental attitudes,
but rather from the proposition that parents should have the oppor-
tunity to substitute their own judgment for that of the government
regarding the education of their children.
V. Alternative Policies Toward Private Group Discrimination
In applying § 1981 to private groups, the choice presented to the
courts is not as simple as merely granting or denying an exemption.
Alternatives are available with corresponding degrees of infringement
143. See note 74 supra.
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on private group freedom to discriminate. Because the costs of pro-
tecting private discrimination may be substantial, a careful considera-
tion of the alternatives may lead a court interested in preserving some
degree of private group autonomy to choose something less than a
blanket exemption from § 1981.
A. Defining an Exemption from § 1981
1. Exempting All Bona Fide Private Groups
This solution would reestablish the conditions that obtained be-
fore the revitalization of § 1981 in Jones. Groups "not in fact open
to the public" would have the right to discriminate under federal
law. A court could hold § 1981 inapplicable to these groups on the
grounds that they had a superior constitutional right to discriminate.
However, because constitutional validation of discrimination might
not be desirable, the constitutional issue might be avoided by ruling
that the private club exemption in the 1964 legislation worked an
implied repeal of the 1866 Act. This solution would incur all the
costs of protecting private discrimination described above.
2. Exempting Only Private Groups in Which Extraordinary
Associational Interests Are Threatened
Some commentators have suggested that a constitutional right to
discriminate could be based on a showing that discrimination is neces-
sary to preserve the purpose and nature of the particular group. 44
The factual characteristics which would satisfy this test would be de-
veloped from the experience in several cases. The courts could look
to the purpose of the group to determine whether the members have
joined together primarily for fellowship with each other or primarily
to share the use of a facility, as in some recreational clubs, or to ob-
tain a service, as in some schools. The court could also hear evidence
on the nature of the activity within the group. The court would
look to the size of the group, whether the members all know each
other, and whether they regularly meet together or instead use club
facilities independently and randomly.
144. See, e.g., Note, supra note 80, at 1214-17; Note, Association, Privacy and Private
Clubs: The Constitutional Conflict, supra note 3, at 469-70; Note, Developing Legal
Vistas for the Discouragement of Private Club Discrimination, 58 IowA L. REv. 108, 136-
41 (1972). The dissent in McCrary v. Runyon, No. 73-2348 (4th Cir., Apr. 15, 1975),
slip opinion at 36-37, emphasized the small size of the schools and hinted that larger
schools might not have a right to discriminate.
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This approach would improve the potential for access by blacks to
some groups and facilitate some integration. But the protection af-
forded explicit racial exclusion by other groups would preserve "badges
of slavery" and lend judicial approval to them. For these reasons the
alternatives which follow may be more desirable.
B. Applying § 1981 to Private Groups Subject to
Interpretative Limitations
1. Prohibiting the Use of Race by Groups Employing
Objective Admissions Criteria
This solution relies on a distinction between two types of private
groupsa The first type consists of groups which exercise selectivity
by excluding categories of persons. They may restrict entry on the
basis of criteria such as education, income, political affiliation or pro-
fessional status. The members of the group do not attempt to judge
the individual personal characteristics of applicants who fit into ac-
ceptable categories. This type of group includes many large clubs and
most private schools. To a person who belongs to the appropriate
categories this type of institution resembles a public accommodation;
if he seeks admission he will be admitted and served. Allowing such
a group to use race as a criterion means that blacks who could meet
every other qualification will be barred. The second type of group
is the one in which the existing members, either directly or by com-
mittee, interview prospective applicants and decide on extending mem-
bership on the basis of subjective and usually unstated criteria. These
groups have preserved the ability to reject an applicant because he
"would not fit in" or because members "do not like him." Even a
white applicant in many ways similar to the existing members will
not be admitted if a number of existing members could be expected
not to "like" him.
The "same right" guaranteed by § 1981 would require that the first
type of group formally consider a black applicant and admit him if
he meets nonracial admissions criteria.' 4 6 Such a rule might contribute
145. One commentator has asserted that this is the correct interpretation of § 1981.
See Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the En-forcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, supra note 3, at 494-95. The
position presented here is that it is better viewed as one of several policy alternatives.
146. McCrary v. Runyon, No. 73-2348 (4th Cir., Apr. 15, 1975). This policy rejects
the proposition underlying the exemptions from § 1981 that by rejecting some whites
a group gains the right to reject all blacks. The McCrary court may have found the
rejection of that notion so sensible that it failed to realize that it was making new law.
See note 54 supra.
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substantially to the rights of blacks without unduly harming private
groups. Some old group members might not like having new black
members around. But the nature of the selection process in the past
never insured the exclusion of new white members with whom some
members would rather not associate. Because the nature of the group
was such that there was no prerequisite that everyone "like" (or in
some instances even know) everyone else, the disruption of the group
caused by the admission of blacks might not be very great. Black mem-
bers might be able to use club facilities and associate with members
who do accept them with relatively little forced contact with those
who do not. 47
A strict construction of § 1981 would not, however, guarantee a
black applicant admission to the second type of group. The statute
entitles him to the "same right" as white persons; such a right would
not include actual admission because no white person has guaranteed
admission to these highly selective groups. Such groups could reject
black applicants after formal consideration because they "do not like"
them. Of course, a court could attempt to determine the real reason
for the rejection of a black applicant by such a group. But a court
adopting this limited application of § 1981 would refrain from doing
so on the basis of a conclusion that in such groups generally interper-
sonal contact is very important, and the disruption caused by forced
integration could outweigh the benefits. This policy conclusion would
not require an exemption from § 1981; a court could merely refer to
the right of private groups to be arbitrary and profess an inability
to conclude from available evidence that the refusal was based solely
on race.
48
The major benefit of this approach would be the elimination of
"badges and incidents of slavery," rather than actual integration. Clubs
and schools would have to abandon racist bylaws and admissions poli-
cies and the practice of summarily rejecting black applicants. Actual
integration would be limited by the fact that groups could shift their
admissions policies and continue to exclude blacks for "subjective"
147. Of course, the prejudiced member would be able easily to identify these new
members to whom he objects because of their racial characteristics. But the trauma
caused by his merely having to see them may be little more than he experiences con-
stantly in the general community. Part of the philosophy behind integration has been
that such attitudes are based on ignorance and will diminish as an individual's experi-
ence of interracial contact increases. See G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, supra note 125, at 503,
510.
148. This may be what the court did in Riley v. Adirondack S. School for Girls,
368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973). See note 44 supra. The court said that "the evidence
[was] insufficient to warrant a finding that, but for race, the minor Plaintiff would
have been admitted to the school." Id. at 398. But see note 153 infra.
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reasons.149 Despite this loophole, however, some integration might re-
sult from the elimination of explicit exclusionary policies where mem-
bers are otherwise too indifferent to evade the statute actively.'5 0
2. Freezing Past Admissions Criteria
This approach would be the same as the one above, but would also
deny groups which had used only objective admissions criteria the
right to shift to subjective criteria and continue to exclude blacks.
Groups which were not so intimate that they required subjective
screening of applicants in the past arguably do not have a legitimate
need for such procedures merely because explicit racial exclusion has
been eliminated. The shift in procedure could be enjoined as an at-
tempt at evasion of § 1981. That statute could be held to guarantee
the "same right" in substance as well as form.1 51
This approach would result both in greater access to private schools
and clubs for blacks and in more integration, at the expense of whites
who would rather avoid interracial social contact. In estimating the
extent to which such groups will be disrupted by a broad application
of § 1981, however, due regard should be paid to the likelihood that
the problem will have a self-adjusting aspect. Intimate social groups in
which the prejudice against blacks is most widely shared and intensely
felt will be those which blacks will be the most reluctant to attempt
to penetrate. Where the potential for interpersonal conflict is lower
because the group is larger or feelings are less militant, blacks will
be more likely to make use of § 1981.
149. Integration would also be limited by the fact that disproportionate numbers of
blacks might not be able to meet some objective nonracial admissions criteria. These
objective criteria might be attacked on the basis of similar successful challenges in
the employment area under Title VII and § 1981. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). But in the social group realm, the very purpose of admissions cri-
teria is to reflect preferences of the group generally held to be legitimate. A showing
that the criterion also actually serves to exclude whites who are not wanted should be
a sufficient justification if the generally accepted notion of freedom to associate is to
be preserved. One of the first private club cases to confront this issue is Olzman v. Lake
Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974).
The problem which this Note primarily addresses is discrimination against blacks who
could meet the nonracial criteria which current and future white members qualify tinder.
After eliminating overt discrimination, the chief obstacle to the elimination of this prac-
tice is the improper use of "subjective" criteria.
150. See pp. 1468-69 supra.
151. This approach could be analogized to the remedy used by the courts in the
voting rights cases in the early 1960's. See, eg., United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759,
768-69 (5th Cir. 1964) (to remedy past discrimination in voter registration county re-
quired to freeze actual standards under which the white voters had been registered and
allow blacks to qualify under those standards for at least a year). See generally Fiss,
Gaston County v. United States: Fruition of the Freezing Principle, 1969 Sup. CT. REv.
379 (1969).
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3. Requiring That Groups Justify the Use of Subjective Screening
Procedures Which Have the Effect of Excluding Blacks
This approach would require all groups whose subjective admissions
procedures have the effect of excluding blacks to show that the pro-
cedure is necessary to preserve the purpose and nature of the group.
This requirement would be imposed regardless of the procedures used
in the past. The court would look to characteristics of the group such
as those described above in the discussion of a limited right to dis-
criminate openly.152 But the test would be whether the group requires
the use of subjective admissions criteria; no group would be permitted
to justify an exclusion on the basis of race itself.153
The legal basis of this approach would be that the unnecessary use
of subjective criteria is an indirect method of denying blacks the "same
right" guaranteed by § 1981. Support could be drawn from the Su-
preme Court's decisions in the area of employment discrimination. In
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.154 the Court established the rule that re-
quired job qualifications and examinations which exclude dispropor-
tionate numbers of black applicants violate the employment discrimi-
nation statutes unless the requirements serve "business necessity." The
test here might be thought of as requiring a showing of "social neces-
sity" before a group is allowed to exercise arbitrary personal prefer-
ence in the selection of new members to the detriment of blacks.
4. Judicial Review of Admission Decisions
The most extreme and interventionist alternative could be for the
court to attempt to second-guess the group's reasons for excluding an
applicant. A group might be required to show rational reasons other
than race or arbitrary preference for excluding a black applicant. This
alternative would come closest to eliminating the ability of groups to
exercise personal preference in judging the nonracial characteristics of
152. See p. 1471 supra.
153. Thus, while a requirement of approval by two-thirds of the membership might
be acceptable for a small bridge club, it might serve no purpose independent of racial
exclusion when used by a large golf or tennis club. Because the social aspects of a
school of any size are relatively minor when compared to the educational functions, a
court might hold as a matter of law that the screening of new students on the basis
of the personal preferences of the student body, or a committee of students or admin-
istrators is impermissible where racial exclusion is the result. In Riley v. Adirondack S.
School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973), the court drew heavily on identifiable,
rational and essentially objective reasons for excluding the plaintiff: age, maturity, and
parental attitude. The court might well have hesitated to dismiss the case if the only
reason the headmaster could provide was that lie or other students did not "like" the
plaintiff.
154. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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an applicant.' 55 For this reason, it seems to go beyond giving a black
applicant the "same right" a white applicant currently has.
Conclusion
The judicial resurrection of the 1866 Civil Rights Act by the Su-
preme Court in 1968 amounted to the equivalent of new legislation
enacting a broad, general purpose statute prohibiting discrimination
against blacks. In the employment discrimination area it has come to
be a useful supplement to other statutes without creating significant
problems. But as § 1981 is increasingly applied to discrimination by
private groups, the question of the extent to which groups have a
right to freedom from government supervision necessarily arises. Legal
doctrines developed in the past have recognized the interests involved,
but have done little to answer the question posed where those interests
come into direct conflict.
In resolving the conflict between private gToups and individual
equality, the courts should recognize the existence of several alterna-
tive solutions for reconciling the opposing interests. The courts can
maintain a meaningful freedom for private groups to choose social in-
timates without granting a blanket and absolute right to practice ra-
cial discrimination. Because of the high costs of racial discrimination,
limitations on the great potential offered by § 1981 should be adopted
only after the most careful consideration. The purpose of this Note
has been to contribute to that deliberation.
155. See note 139 supra.
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